The Impact of Corruption on Economic Development of Bangladesh:Evidence on the Basis of an Extended Solow Model by Pulok, Mohammad Habibullah
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Impact of Corruption on Economic
Development of Bangladesh:Evidence on
the Basis of an Extended Solow Model
Mohammad Habibullah Pulok
Stockholm Univrsity
15. September 2010
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/28755/
MPRA Paper No. 28755, posted 12. February 2011 19:04 UTC
 
 
The Impact of Corruption on Economic 
Development of Bangladesh: 
Evidence on the Basis of an Extended Solow Model 
 
 
Mohammad Habibullah Pulok* 
 
 
 
Abstract: The purpose of this thesis is to examine the long run relationship between economic 
growth and corruption in Bangladesh over the period 1984-2008. In this study, I have 
extended the neoclassical model of economic growth by Solow (1956) including human 
capital and public sector explicitly at first. Then, I have incorporated corruption into the 
augmented model using a specific functional form for total factor productivity and three other 
channels to show impact of corruption on real GDP per capita. To investigate empirically the 
existence of a long run relationship or co-integration between corruption and real GDP per 
capita, I have used Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Bounds Test method. The 
results of co-integration test confirms that there is a long run relation among corruption, GDP 
per capita and other determinants of GDP over the study period. The long run estimates 
indicate that corruption has direct negative impact on per capita GDP i.e. economic 
development of Bangladesh.  
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Chapter-1: 
1. 1: Introduction 
Corruption is regarded as an inherent problem for human civilization because of its adverse 
impact on the progress of humankind. Although its definition, dimension and consequences 
are continuously changing over time, corruption has spread deep root in the societies since the 
Stone Age. Sometime, it is claimed that corruption is beneficial for the society to some extent 
but in a single word, it is a curse for the society. If it is pervasive in any society then it 
becomes a disastrous virus to halt the normal functioning of that society in particular. After 
the end of cold war, the issue of corruption has received distinct attention around the world 
especially in developing countries due to immense freedom of press and flourish of 
democracy. In any case, growing public awareness and concern over corruption in last two 
decades have resulted in a significant upsurge in both theoretical and empirical researches to 
analyze economic consequence of corruption. Thus, an increasing bulk of empirical analysis 
reveals that corruption has undesirable, devastating and widespread consequences on 
investment, human development, poverty reduction, effectiveness of both public and private 
sectors and thus on economic development of many countries in the world. 
When corruption is prevalent in a country, it causes economic malaise, wastage of public 
resources, jeopardizes the environment for domestic and foreign investment and general 
morale in the public service, reinforces political instability and propagates social and 
economic disparities even in the presence of favorable economic and social policies. The 
World Bank (1997) has identified corruption as “the single greatest obstacle to economic and 
social development”1. Again, the World Bank (2004) has projected that more than US$ 1 
trillion is paid for bribes over the world as a whole each year. In a nutshell, corruption has 
detrimental effect on economic prosperity and sustainable development of a country through 
several transmission mechanisms. This thesis pays a particular attention to the impact of 
corruption on economic development of Bangladesh. Bangladesh is a poor country by 
definition. At the same time Bangladesh is among the highly corrupted countries of the world 
according to Transparency International’s corruption perception index (CPI) and other indices 
of corruption. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the long run relationship between economic growth 
and corruption in Bangladesh over the period 1984-2008. Intensifying discussions and debates 
                                                            
1Anti-corruption website of World Bank (www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt) 
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among the economists, policy makers, civil society, domestic and foreign investors and 
multilateral donors regarding the costs and consequences of corruption in Bangladesh have 
motivated me to undertake this research work. Because no effort has been taken yet to 
investigate the impact of corruption on economic development using time series data for 
Bangladesh. 
 
Many of the earlier studies of corruption and growth relationship suffer from weak linkage 
between theoretical framework and empirical model adapted. Moreover, it is difficult to get 
precise estimation of the impact of corruption on economic development via different 
channels such as investment, human capital, public sector, openness etc. for a single country 
from cross-sectional regression analysis. In fact, times series studies on corruption- growth 
relationship using sophisticated econometric methods are almost rare in existing literatures. 
Therefore, to overcome these shortcomings, I have extended the neoclassical model of 
economic growth by Solow (1956) including human capital and public sector explicitly at 
first. Then I have incorporated corruption into the augmented model using a specific 
functional form for total factor productivity and three other channels to show impact of 
corruption on real GDP per capita. To investigate empirically whether there exists a long run 
relationship or co-integration between corruption and real GDP per capita or not, I have used 
Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Bounds Test method which has certain advantages 
for small sample size over traditional co-integration techniques using time series data for that 
period. Then, I have estimated the overall impact corruption on economic development (Real 
GDP per capita) as well as the effects through different transmission channels of economic 
growth. 
 
The organization of the thesis is outlined here as follows. A brief definition of corruption 
from an economic point of view and a precise overview of economic development and 
corruption in Bangladesh are provided in the next two sections of this chapter. In chapter two, 
I discuss the existing literatures on corruption and economic growth with few examples of 
specific studies related to Bangladesh. The theoretical framework for my empirical analysis is 
presented in chapter three. Econometric models, data and the methodology are presented in 
chapter four. A simple contemporaneous correlation and graphical analyses of key variables 
are provided straightaway after that chapter. Chapter six presents the empirical results from 
this study. Last of all, chapter seven summarizes the main conclusions from my study.  
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1. 2: Definition of Corruption 
It is very a very challenging task to define a complex phenomenon like corruption because it 
is viewed differently from different aspects. Although there is rapidly growing interests 
among policy makers, NGOs ,donor agencies, academicians etc. to identify the causes and 
consequences of corruption, still no consensus has been made to define corruption 
comprehensively in existing literatures. Its notion varies across country, culture, society and 
of course overtime. One activity may be viewed as corruption in developing countries while it 
may not be in developed countries. In general, the term “corruption” is always used to label a 
large set of illegal activities ranging from “bribery” to “extortion”, from “embezzlement” to 
“nepotism”. In this paper I am concerned with the corruption in public sector governance and 
its impact on economy of Bangladesh. That is why the scope to define corruption from 
different perspective is limited here. The World Bank’s definition of corruption is “The abuse 
of public office for private gain. Corruption is every transaction between actors from the 
private and public sectors through collective utilities that are illegally transformed into private 
gains”2. But there is no way to believe that corruption is only a problem within public 
administration. Corruption is also pervasive in private sector. Klitgaard (1998) has given a 
very simple definition of this multidimensional subject as: C=M+D-A-S where C=Corruption, 
M= Monopoly, D= Discretion, A= Accountability and S= Public sector salaries3. Put 
differently, the degree of corruption depends on the amount of monopoly power and 
unrestricted supremacy that official's exercise and the extent to which they are held 
responsible for their actions. The UN's Dictionary of Social Science explain as “ Corruption 
in public life is the use of public power for private profit, preferment of prestige or for the 
benefit of group or class, in a way that constitutes a breach of law of standards of high moral 
conduct”(1978:43). According to Transparency International (TI-2009), corruption is the 
misuse of entrusted political power for personal gain. 
 
In the light of the above discussion, corruption can be defined in a broader perspective as the 
exploitation of public resources and avoidance of public laws that results in unfair personal 
gains, lessen economic growth rate and encourages greater inequality of income. 
 
                                                            
2Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank, PREM, World Bank, 1997(pp-8) 
 
3 Mathematically, we can say that C varies positively with M and D, and negatively with A and S. 
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In Bangladesh, corruption is considered as one of the major obstacles in the path economic 
development. It has become rampant all over the society in this county since the independence 
in 1971. In general, corruption is regarded somewhat obviously as 'a way of life' among the 
mass people of Bangladesh. Re-establishment of parliamentary democracy from a dictatorial 
military government in 1991 does not seem to have any influence on the nature and scope of 
corruption. Corruption is a severe problem in the public sector of Bangladesh from an 
international perspective also. Bangladesh had been ranked as the most corrupt country in 
2001, 2002 and 2003 consecutively in Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI). According to the index of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), 
Bangladesh was ranked as the sixth most corrupted nation out of the 123 nations of the world 
during 1991-97. The following table-1 presents the comparative score of Bangladesh based on 
above two corruption indices: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is evident from the table that the score of perception-based level of corruption in 
Bangladesh has remained very low over the period of 2001-2008 though the situation has 
been better in recent later years. As corruption has infected every sphere of the society like a 
cancer, it has devastating impact on overall economic development of the country. The image 
of the country among donors and foreign investors has moved away largely. Corruption in 
Bangladesh shifts away public resources from productive to unproductive sectors, lessens the 
efficiency of the public officials involving them into rent seeking, restrains government from 
implementing good policies, demoralizes public confidence in government and so on. United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on  “Corruption and Good Governance" 
Table-1: Bangladesh’s score in Corruption Indices:2001-2008  
 TI Corruption Perceptions Index ICRG Corruption Index 
Year Score 0—10 
0=most corrupt 
Score* 0—6 
0=most corrupt 
2001 0.40 1.80 
2002 1.20 1.00 
2003 1.30 1.00 
2004 1.50 1.04 
2005 1.70 2.50 
2006 2.00 2.50 
2007 2.00 2.04 
2008 2.10 2.50 
Note:* Monthly values are averaged to get index score of each of year. 
Source:  Transparency International (TI-2009) and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG-2010). 
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Chapter- 2: Review of previous literatures 
This chapter is designed to give an overview of the earlier research works on corruption. 
Although theoretical and empirical research on investigating the relation between corruption 
and economic development is relatively a new arena in modern economics, there exists a vast 
literature on this field7. Research on corruption has attracted immense importance since the 
early 1990’s among the economists because it has widespread consequences on economic 
development8. Most of the empirical works are either cross sectional or based on panel data 
while there is probably no study yet using pure time series data for a single country. 
 
Although there is a budding consensus that corruption is detrimental to the society, theories 
concerning the influence of corruption have been conflicting to some extents. Some studies 
have found that corruption works as lubricant to increase the speed of wheels of economic 
activity and thus accelerates economic growth. Inspired by Leff (1964) and Huntington 
(1968), this school of thought claims that corruption is beneficial in a sense that bribes act as 
speed money for the entrepreneurs and businessmen to avoid bureaucratic delays and 
cumbersome rules and regulations in investment mechanisms. For example, in an equilibrium 
queuing model Lui(1985) suggest that efficiency of the public administration improves as 
bribing tactics to reduce waiting costs  form a non co-operative  Nash equilibrium game 
among businessmen. Again, competition among public officials can also reduce corruption 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1978). On the other hand, many studies have claimed that corruption is a 
hindrance to development as it slows down the pace economic activity by exerting negative 
externalities through its long-lasting effect in the economic environment. This opposite strand 
to the speed money proposition claims that corrupt practices between public administration 
and investors are very detrimental to the overall economic prosperity as it undesirably affects 
the quality and quantity of investment. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) point out that corruption is 
more distortionary than taxation and is responsible for raising the cost of doing business, 
which in turn impedes economic growth. Because it is illegal and it must be kept secret to 
evade detection and penalty. Moreover, corrupt government officials in poor countries are 
always interested to spend much resource on military and infrastructure where the scope on 
                                                            
7Bardhan.P( 1997), Lambsdorff, J. G.(1999), Jain (2001) and Adit (2003 )provide extensive review on empirical 
literatures  of corruption. 
 
8 See Figure-A1 in the appendix-1which displays the studies on the consequences of corruption during1995-
2005. 
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corruption is vast rather than spending on education and health. In a very famous paper 
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) give evidence that the pace of development of country is 
usually halted when talented people are involved in rent seeking activities. In order to get a 
clear overview of previous studies on the affect of corruption on economic development, I 
have divided the discussion as underneath.  
 
2. 1 Corruption and Economic Growth 
 
Most of the empirical studies that investigate the direct relationship between corruption and 
economic growth have found that pace of economic growth rate is slowed down due to 
corruption9. The problem associated with this kind of research is the direction of causality 
between corruption and economic growth. Lambsdorff (1999) in his review of literature 
argues that low GDP per capita can cause corruption while opposite might be true. Mauro 
initiated the systemic study on the corruption and growth using econometric tools in 1995. 
Following Solow-Barro style cross-country growth regression framework, he studied the 
relationship between corruption and economic growth using Business International (BI) 
corruption index. He found substantial negative association between corruption and the 
average annual economic growth rate over the period of 1960-85for 70 countries. With the 
help of Lucas type model Brunetti (1997) gives evidence that corruption has negative 
insignificant impact on growth .In an environment of less effective government and fragile 
rule of law corruption is even more harmful for economic growth. Ehrlich and Lui (1999) 
claimed that economic growth rate is lower due corruption (which is a result of higher level of 
government intervention).Again, Mo (2001) has shown that corruption reduces economic 
growth through human capital and political instability channels. His study reveals that 1% rise 
in the corruption level decreases the growth rate by about 0.72%. Furthermore, in a similar 
kind of study Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2005) catch that corruption substantially impacts 
economic growth and income over time. Nevertheless, the negative effect is not always 
evident in empirical studies. For example Barreto (2001), replicating Mauro (1995) has 
proved that there exists a direct positive relation between growth and corruption. More 
specifically, some East Asian countries have performed well to sustain a good GDP growth 
rate in spite of high perceived level of corruption (Rock and Bonnett, 2004). Augmenting the 
                                                            
9Mauro (1995,1997), Brunetti, (1997), Poirson, (1998),  Ehrlich and Lui, (1999),Li, Xu and Zou (2000), Mo (2001), Abed 
and Davoodi  (2002), Leite and Weidmann (2002) and Meon and Sekkat (2005) have found that corruption hurts economic 
development. 
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work of Mauro (1995) and using ICRG index of corruption, Rahman, Kisunko and 
Kapoor(2000)provide evidence in a cross sectional study that corruption has significant 
negative impact on per capita GDP of Bangladesh. The study points out “if corruption in 
Bangladesh could be reduced to levels existing in transition economies like Poland, then 
during the 1990-97 period Bangladesh could have increased its annual average per capita 
growth rate by more than 2 percent (from 3.4 percent to about 5.5 percent per annum)”10. In 
line with Mauro’s findings, Wei (2001) calculated that per capita GDP growth rate in 
Bangladesh could be doubled by 1985 if it would be able to reduce its corruption level to that 
of Singapore. Dreher and Herzfer, (2005) estimated that GDP growth rate in Bangladesh is 
reduced by 23%as it has above average corruption level according to ICRG index. So far, 
econometric studies largely confirm that corruption is detrimental to economic growth. 
 
2. 2: Corruption and Investment 
Levine and Renelt (1992) show that the investment is a robust determining factor of economic 
growth. In most of cases economists have found negative relation between corruption and 
investment. Beginning again with the seminal work Mauro (1995) confirms that corruption 
has substantial negative effect on investment. Corruption acting as tax on return to private 
investment indirectly lowers both the quality and quantity of investment. For example, 
Mauro(1995,pp-3) says “if Bangladesh were able to reduce corruption by one standard 
deviation to the level of Uruguay, its investment rate would increase by almost 5 percent and 
its annual rate of growth would rise by over one-half percent.” Similar findings are also 
illustrated in Rahman, Kisunko and Kapoor (2000) in which corruption has significant impact 
on gross domestic investment of Bangladesh. In addition, effect of corruption on the quality 
of investment is investigated by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and discovered that it decreases 
the quality of the infrastructure as measured by the condition of paved roads and power 
outages. In a cross sectional study over 1970-85 Mo (2001) finds that investment channel 
causes about 28% of the growth rate reduction in the corruption–growth linkage. In addition, 
Campos, Lien and Pradhan (1999) verified that impact of corruption on investment is not 
severe if corruption is predictable. FDI inflows are also affected by corruption in transition 
economies (Abed and Davoodi, 2002). To summarize, we can say that most studies found that 
corruption hinders investment, which is an important contributor of GDP. 
 
 
                                                            
10Rahman, Kisunko and Kapoor,  (2000,pp-11) 
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2. 3: Corruption and Public Sector 
 
 
In most cases the relationship between public sector and corruption are investigated under 
empirical studies of economic development and corruption. In an explicit research, Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1997) explored several important findings. The most important among these is 
corruption provides opportunities to increase the size of public investment at the cost of 
private investment. Again, corruption lessens the efficiency of government investment and of 
a country’s infrastructure. Mauro (1998) also gets almost similar results. Again, Tanzi (1998) 
mentioned that corruption increases government spending while it reduces government 
revenue at the same time. In addition corruption induces higher military spending which 
indirectly results in higher government expenditure exerting negative impact on growth Gupta 
et al. (2001).So, many studies conclude that corruption affects public sector in various ways. 
 
2. 4: Corruption and Human Development 
 
Research has not grown so far too much to explore corruption and human capital investment 
relation both theoretically and empirically. Corruptions also have some indirect negative 
impacts on human development through lowering economic growth. Corrupt countries tend to 
have less human development. Corruption shifts away government investment from health 
and education to unproductive sectors as the rent extracting scope is limited in these sectors 
(Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson (2002) indicates that corruption 
decreases the level of social spending, nurtures education inequality, lowers secondary 
schooling, and causes uneven  distribution of land. Mauro (1998) gives empirical evidence 
that corruption skews public investment on education in a cross sectional study. Further, Mo 
(2001) finds that a country where corruption is more pervasive, average schooling is lower. 
Using Human Development indicator (HDI)-1998, Akçay (2006) establishes that there is 
strong negative relation between human development and corruption indices in a sample of 63 
different countries of the world. So, according the previous studies we can summarize that 
corruption tends to lower human development in many cases. 
 
Thus, according to the above discussion on earlier studies, I can conclude that corruption 
adversely effects economic development having negative impact on various determinants of 
economic growth. However, there are also few exceptions to this finding 
11 
 
Chapter-3: Theoretical framework  
This section deals with developing a neo-classical framework for corruption- growth relation 
based on the hypothesis that corruption has negative impact on economic growth. The 
existing literatures on examining the consequence of corruption on growth suffer from a 
theoretical structure work that does not  includes the possible effect of corruption on income 
per capita via different transmission mechanisms. In other words, these studies have failed to 
analyze both direct and indirect effect together in some cases. Economic growth of a country 
depends on several determinants such as physical capital investment, public sector 
investment, foreign investment, trade ,human capital investment etc. and of course on 
technological advancement. These factors can also be affected by corruption. Thus, it is 
essential to decompose the direct and indirect effects of corruption on growth. Based on the 
classical work of Solow (1956), an extended neoclassical model of economic growth will be 
developed in this chapter that explicitly includes not only physical capital accumulation but 
also human capital accumulation and public sector. Later on, using a specific functional form, 
corruption will be incorporated into the augmented model to show how it can directly affect 
income per capita as well through the different transmission mechanisms as mentioned above. 
 
3. 1: An extended Solow model with public sector 
 
In the Solow model, output, physical capital, labor and knowledge (reflects the degree of 
technological development of a country) are the four variables which are used to explain the 
economic growth path of a country. In this model savings rate, population growth, and 
technological progress are exogenous variables. Capital and labor are the two inputs of 
production and each are paid their marginal price. Based on these specifications, a labor 
augmenting neoclassical production function in Cobb-Douglas form at time (t) can be written 
as follows: 
 
α 1-α(t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t)Y  = F (K ,A L  = K  (A L )    where,  0 < α<  1                                (1)  
 
Here, Y is the aggregate level of real income, K is the level of physical capital, L stands the 
amount of labor employed, and A denotes total or multifactor productivity. In the above 
function, time affects output only through K, L and A.  
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There is no explicit place for government or public sector in the Solow model as stated above. 
But the role of public sector economic development is very crucial in many respects. In a 
developing or less developed country like Bangladesh, the role of government in distributing 
and allocating resources is very important. Public sector has productive externality for the 
private producers, which come at the cost of private disposable income by the taxes. 
Moreover, in the earlier stage of development government sector often plays the key role as 
an engine of economic growth. In reference to, Arrow and Kurz (1970) and Barro (1991), 
public sector can be incorporated directly into the production function as follows:    
 
α γ 1-α-γ(t) (t) (t (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) )Y = F K , G , A L  = K  G  (A L )   where   (α + γ) < 1                      (2)  
 
Here G stands for public sector. The above equation presents how output is depended upon 
physical capital, public sector, and labor. 
3. 2: An extended Solow model with public sector and human capital 
 
Following the approach of Mankiew, Romer and Weil (1992), human capital has been 
included into the Solow model including a public sector. Human capital has been considered 
as a key determinant of economic growth in growth literature. Many researchers have shown 
that including human capital in the production function improves the explanatory power of the 
Solow model. Based on the above discussion, it now possible to present the complete 
neoclassical model of growth including government sector and human capital accumulation in 
the following form: 
β γ 1-α-β-γα(t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t) (t)Y  = F K , H , G , A L  = K  H  G  (A L )    where (α+β+γ)<1       (3)  
 
Here, H is the stock of human capital. The equation (3) is the extended Solow model with 
public sector and human capital. It shows how aggregate level of output is determined by 
three inputs. 
The growth rate of labor force is defined as n tL (t)= L (0 )e . So the growth rate of labor force is 
constant overtime that is 
.
L = n
L
where n is the population growth rate. It is also assumed that 
overall productivity function evolves according to the function tA(t)=A(0)e and it constant 
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over time that is 
.
A
=
A
 where ϖ is the growth rate of technological progress. Here, 
(α+β+γ)<1 implies that production function exhibits decreasing returns to each input. Now the 
intensive form of production function can be written as below: 
β γαy ( t ) = k ( t ) h ( t ) g ( t )                                ( 4 )
Y(t) K(t) H(t)where , y(t)= , k(t)= , h(t)= 
A(t)L(t) A(t)L(t) A(t)L(t)
G(t)and g(t)= 
A(t)L(t)  
represents the level of 
income per unit of effective labor, physical capital per unit of effective labor and so on. Let us 
denote Sk, Sh and Sg as the shares of income which are invested in physical, human and 
government capital. So the evolutions for physical, human and government capital per unit of 
effective labor can be stated as follows: 
.
k k k ( t ) =  s y ( t ) - ( n + + δ ) k ( t )                                         ( 5 )  
.
h h h ( t )=   s y ( t )- (n + + δ )  h ( t)                                                         (6 )  
.
g g  g ( t ) =  s y ( t ) - (n + + δ )  g ( t )                                                     (7 )  
The implication of equations (5), (6) and (7) is that all capitals per effective unit of labor 
converge to a steady-state value. “It is assumed that same production function applies to 
human capital, physical capital, government capital and consumption. In other words one unit 
of consumption can be transformed costly into either one unit of private capital or human 
capital or government capital” (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992,pp-11). For the sake of 
simplicity, let us assume δ=δk =δh =δg which means that depreciation rate is same for all 
capitals. Using equations (5), (6) and (7) when the economy converges to a steady-state can 
be defined as follows: 
1 -β - γ β γ 1* gk h ( 1 -α -β - γ )s  s  sk = ( )                                                          ( 8 )
n + + δ  
1 -α -γ α γ 1* h k g (1 -α -β -γ )s  s  sh = ( )                                                          (9 )
n + + δ
1-α -β α γ 1* g k h (1-α -β -γ)s  s  s g =  ( )                                                                  (10)
n+ +δ  
Equations (8), (9), and (10) indicate that steady-state capitals increase with higher levels of 
saving and decrease with higher rates of population growth. By substituting equations (8), (9) 
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and (10) into the production function and taking the natural logarithm ,the following equation 
for income per capita is obtained : 
0 k
gh                                   ( 1 1
( t ) (α + β + γ )Y αln { } = ln ( A ) + t - ln ( n + + δ ) + ln ( s ) + L ( t ) ( 1 -α -β -γ ) ( 1 -α -β -γ )
β γln ( s ) + ln ( s )             ( 1 -α -β -γ ) ( 1 -α -β -γ )
                     
               
)
 
The equation (11) shows how income per capita is dependent on population growth, 
depreciation rate, initial level of total factor productivity and its growth and accumulation of 
public, physical and human capital. Without the government sector, this model is similar to 
the model developed by Mankiew, Romer and Weil (1992).  Equation (11) reveals that steady 
state income per worker is accumulative in initial level of total factor productivity and its 
growth rate and physical, public and human capital investment rates. Higher initial level of 
total factor productivity increases steady state income per worker and the higher the growth 
rate of total factor productivity the higher the steady state income per worker, as well. The 
above equation also implies that a country that saves more of its income has more capital per 
worker and more income per worker. Furthermore, a country with higher population growth 
has less capital and income per worker because savings must be depleted in order to maintain 
its capital-labor ratio. 
 
3.3: Reformulating the extended Solow model by incorporating corruption 
 
The model developed in the previous section does not provide a deep understanding of 
economic growth. There are several other factors, which can have, both level and growth 
effect on economic growth of a country. For example, North (1990) argued that institutions in 
a country determine its long-run economic performance. Here institutions refer to political 
stability, quality of government, independent judicial system, political rights, property rights 
etc. So it is possible to modify the above model of economic growth to explain how these 
matters can also have impact on the development of a country. In recent past, many 
researchers have investigated the impact of several dimensions of institutions both 
theoretically and empirically. Many of them have taken either the level of corruption or level 
of corruption control as a measurement of institutions. Corruption can directly affect the 
income per capita or growth through affecting total factor productivity of the country. 
Besides, corruption influences growth indirectly by affecting physical capital investment, 
public sector investment, human capital, etc. 
15 
 
 
Let us first concentrate on the discussion of the direct impact of corruption on growth in the 
light of the augmented Solow model derived above. Total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
measures the changes in output not caused by changes in inputs. TFP growth explains the 
effect of technological change, efficiency improvements, and our inability to measure directly 
the contribution of all other inputs. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that corruption 
reduces the efficiency gain from technological advancement by imposing negative externality 
on it. Countries with high level of corruption gain less benefit from technological 
advancement. In order to show the direct of corruption via total factor productivity a structural 
form for the evolution of total factor productivity should be assumed. To allow for 
specification, let us assume that 
- η θ
( t ) ( t )A ( θ )  =  A e                                                                   ( 1 2 )
 
Here, 0 ≤ θ ≤1 and A (t) = A (t)eϖt 
The parameter θ is the index of corruption that we will use later as a measurement of level of 
corruption in a country and η determines the magnitude of the effect of corruption on growth. 
It is assumed that  dA(t)  < 0
dθ  
and 
2
2
 d A(t) > 0
dθ . From equation (12), when there is no corruption 
or (θ=0) then At=A0eϖt.This is also same for the case when η=0.The specific functional form 
in equation (12) reproduces the result of equation (11) into the following equation:  
0 k
gh
Y ( t ) (α + β + γ ) αl n { }  =   ln ( A ) + t - ln ( n + + δ ) + ln S
L ( t ) ( 1 -α -β -γ ) ( 1 -α -β -γ )
β γ+ ln S + ln S -  η θ                                           ( 1 3 )
( 1 -α -β - γ ) ( 1 -α -β -γ )
                    
               
 
The above model explains how corruption has direct influence on income per capita. It shows 
that corruption has direct impact on growth by changing the overall productivity of the 
economy. If the level of corruption is high according to corruption index (θ), it will reduce per 
capita income. Again, a positive value of η implies that corruption diminishes output per 
worker while a negative value means that corruption is output enhancing.  
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Now, I will define the transmission channels through which impact of corruption on economic 
growth is diffused in the augmented Solow model. Let us consider the case of the public 
sector channel at first. In order to finance public sector expenditure government imposes 
taxes. However, at the presence of corruption in the public sector, the effective tax system 
gets distorted. Again, due to the corrupt behavior of the public officials the provision of the 
public input can also be mismanaged. According to Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), corruption 
retards the productivity of public investment and of a country’s infrastructure and may reduce 
tax revenue because it compromises the government’s ability to collect taxes and tariffs. 
Therefore, the government generates fewer amounts of productive inputs for a given amount 
of tax revenue at the presence of corruption11.Moreover; corruption skews the composition of 
public expenditure away from needed operation and maintenance towards expenditure on new 
equipment (Klitgaard, 1990). Thus, it is possible to express the public sector input or 
investment as a function of the average tax rate (τ), output (yt) and the level of corruption;
t tg = g(τ ,y ,θ )  
Secondly, corruption can affect growth by having impact on investment. Corruption raises 
operational cost, creates uncertainty, and thereby lowers investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1993). According to Lambsdorff (2003) and Mauro (1995, 1997) by increasing uncertainty 
and reducing productivity, corruption can affect investment negatively. Because of corruption, 
uncertainty necessitates an added premium on investment returns, which in turn raises real 
interest rate and leads to lower investment demand. It should be noted that when the quality 
and quantity of public input is depressed as through above discussed channels, it also has 
negative externality on private capital productivity. This relationship can be postulated as 
follows: 
t tk =k(r (θ)) where, rtis the real interest rate which is itself an increasing function of corruption. 
In our context tr (θ )> 0 and tk (θ )< 0 . 
 
Finally, the impact of corruption on human capital formation should be considered to make 
the growth model complete and comprehensive. Although it is somewhat complex to capture 
the idea how human capital formation is distorted at the presence of corruption, I try to keep it 
                                                            
11 “The Effects of Corruption on Growth, Investment and Government Expenditure: A Cross Country Analysis” 
by   Mauro.P (1997) has good explanation on how corruption affects tax revenue collection and the adverse 
consequences of corruption on government budget.   
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as simple as possible. Corruption distorts the allocation of resources in human capital 
formation and quality of human capital investment also. According to Mauro (1998), public 
officials do not want to spend more on education and health because this spending programme 
offers less opportunity for rent seeking. Gupta, Davoodi, and Tiongson (2000) conclude that 
corruption has negative impact on health care and education services in two ways: (1) 
corruption may raise the cost of these services, and (2) corruption may reduce the quality of 
these services. Moreover, skilled and talented workforce engaged in rent seeking activities 
which lowers the pace of human development. In this paper, I will only consider the case 
where corruption affects human capital accumulation through its negative effect on 
educational expenditure. The mechanism can be presented by assuming the following 
functional form: 
 
t th =h(EX (θ)) where EX (θ) shows that expenditure on education is a function of corruption and 
EX (θ)<0  
Based on the above arguments, the steady state equation for income per worker from equation 
(13) including corruption for revealing both direct and indirect effect can be reproduced as 
follows: 
t
t
0 k ( r (θ ) )
g th ( E X (θ ) )
Y ( t ) (α + β + γ ) αl n { } = ln ( A ) + t - ln ( n + + δ ) + ln s
L ( t ) ( 1 -α -β -γ ) ( 1 -α -β -γ )
β γ+ ln s + ln s ( τ ,y ,θ ) -η θ                           ( 1 4 )
( 1 -α -β -γ ) ( 1 -α -β -γ )
                    
               
 
Equation (14) illuminates both the direct and indirect impacts of corruption on the per capita 
output over time.  As an increase in corruption reduces total factor productivity, an increase in 
the level corruption has an inverse relationship with growth of income  per worker Corruption 
also indirectly impacts per capita output growth by reducing the growth of physical capital, 
human capital and diminishing the productive externality provided by the public sector. This 
modeling approach has several advantages over the models used in the literature: i) 
importantly, it builds on the well-known neoclassical growth model ii) the model allows the 
use of the modern time series data methods in estimations iii) in addition the incorporation of 
the growth effects of corruption into the model is done in a general way that captures both 
direct and indirect effect of corruption.  
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Chapter-4: Empirical framework, Data and Methodology  
 
4. 1: Econometric Models 
 
To achieve the main purpose of this research i.e. testing the existence of long run relationship 
between economic growth and corruption and examining the direct and indirect consequences 
of corruption on economic development in Bangladesh, I have used modern time series 
econometric techniques for the period of 1984-2008. If there is a long run relationship(co-
integration), then I would estimate impact of corruption on economic growth. Therefore, this 
chapter outlines the structure of econometric models designed and their relevance in the light 
of the theoretical framework developed in the previous chapter. It is apparent from our 
extended Solow model that income per capita depends on physical, public and human capital 
accumulation. Thus, the following base model without corruption will be estimated at first: 
 
t 0 1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t tl n Y =  β + β l n I N V + β l n G V X + β l n E D X + β l n Z + u           ( I )  
t t tH e re ,     Z ln ( + δ+ n )
 
 
In the above specification, Y denotes Real GDP per capita, which is used as an alternative for 
income per worker. In most of the empirical growth literatures, researchers use this as an 
indicator of economic growth of a country. Gross fixed capital formation is used for 
measuring physical capital formation, which is denoted by INV. Further, GVX stands 
government final consumption expenditure, which is taken as proxy for public sector input, 
and EDX indicates public expenditure on education, which is proxy for human capital 
formation. Here, Z is used to denote the accumulation of total factor productivity growth rate 
(ϖ), depreciation rate (δ) and population growth rate (n) as explained in theoretical frame 
work. Lastly, u is the usual error term with classical properties and t stands for the time index. 
Hence, the estimation of the above equation would be used to explain the long run 
determinants of economic growth of Bangladesh. Based on the theoretical framework, it is 
expected that the signs of coefficients of INV, GVX and EDX would be positive. The value of 
each parameter associated with each variable will reflect the long run contribution of various 
determinants of economic development. 
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Adding corruption as an explanatory variable in the base model, it is possible to estimate the 
effect of corruption on economic growth. Therefore, motivated by the theoretical model stated 
in equation (14), the following empirical model will be estimated: 
 
t 0 1 t 2 t 3 t 4 t 5 t t1lnY = β +β lnIN V +β lnG V X +β lnED X +β ln Z +β lnC O R +u           (II)  
Here, COR represents the index of corruption, which will be discussed in details in the next 
section of this chapter. In order to avoid the problem of non-normality and interpretation, I 
have multiplied the index corruption by hundred (100) and taken natural log of it. The 
expected sign of corruption parameter is negative which would reflect the negative impact on 
real GDP per capita or economic growth as derived in the theoretical model. It shows the 
direct effect of corruption on per capita real GDP. By analyzing the signs and change in the 
parameter value associated with the determinants of GDP, we would be able to understand 
how corruption influences it through various channels. As priori, we can say that it will 
decrease the parameter values as in equation (I). 
 
4.2: The choice of indicators and their sources 
This section provides a discussion of the choice of indicators used in this research paper and 
their sources. Annual aggregate time series data for Bangladesh is used in this study which 
consists of 25 observations for the period of 1984-2008. The sample size is relatively small 
due to the unavailability of the data on the measurement of corruption for Bangladesh. But the 
most important matter is that the most recent data has been used for this study. Real GDP per 
capita (constant 2000 US$) is used as proxy for income per capita which is the dependent 
variable in our empirical models. It is the value of all final goods and services produced 
within the geographical area of a country during one-year period divided by consumer price 
index. Gross fixed capital formation or investment comprises land improvements, plant, 
machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads, railways, and the like, 
including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings, and commercial and 
industrial buildings12.Government final consumption expenditure consists all contemporary 
government expense to buy goods and services including salaries of employees. Note that 
military investment is not included in government final consumption expenditure. Public 
expenditure on education is the government current expense on education sector. These three 
                                                            
12 Definition of World Bank’s  world development indicator (WDI-2008) database. 
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variables are taken as a percentage share of GDP. Population growth rate is annual growth of 
population in percentage term. I have assumed 3% (percentage) depreciation rate for all 
capitals. The primary sources of these statistics are World Bank Development Indicators 
(WDI) data base, Ministry of Education   and Ministry of Finance Bangladesh, Bangladesh 
Bank (Central Bank of Bangladesh) etc.  
I have extracted data for total factor productivity (TFP) growth rate from the total economy 
data base of the Conference Board13. According to their definition, TFP growth measures the 
changes in output not produced by the changes in inputs. It can be technological 
advancement, improvement in efficiency and many other factors which are not measurable. A 
complete list of variables used in this paper including their sources and description is 
provided in table-A1 in appendix-2. 
I have chosen the corruption index of the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) ratings 
complied by the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group Inc. The prime reason for using this 
index is that it has data on corruption date back to 1984 for Bangladesh. Again, this data base 
is used extensively for researches in corruption, appearing recently in the empirical studies of 
Knack and Keefer (1995), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997), Rahman, Kisunko and Kapoor (2000), 
Dreherand Herzfel (2005)Seldadyo and Haan (2006) ,Wei (2000)and so on. According to 
ICRG,this corruption index is an estimator of the degree of political corruption in a political 
system. It is a subjective measure of corruption that ranges from “0” to “6”, with “0” being 
the highest corrupt. This index is prepared on monthly basis. As all other variables used in 
this study are yearly, I have transformed the monthly data in to yearly data by taking the 
average at first. Secondly, for tranquil and simple interpretation of the empirical results and to 
make it more intuitive, I have reversed the raw corruption data into an index ranging from “0” 
to “1” where the higher the index the higher the level of average corruption. In a nutshell, the 
proxy variable for corruption index is constructed in this way: t
θC O R = ( 1 - )
6
, Where CORt 
stands for the measurement of corruption in the empirical analysis. Now-a-days, there are 
several organizations which have constructed indices for measuring the level of corruption. 
Except ICRG, these are Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International, 
Kaufman and Kraay’ index (KK), the Business International Index (BI) and the World 
Economic Forum index (GCR).  It should be noted that correlation among different corruption 
                                                            
13The Conference Board Total Economy Database, January 2010, http://www.conference-
board.org/data/economydatabase/ 
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indices are high (see table-A2 in appendix-2). Although these quantifiable measures that are 
widely used by researchers to link economic performance with corruption, the main 
limitations of the majority of these measures are their heavy bias towards the perception of 
foreign investors and experts, their poll-based nature and restricted coverage.  
 
4. 3: Regression Techniques  
 
There are a number of methods available to examine the existence of long run equilibrium 
relationship or the co-integration among the time series variables. The most common 
techniques are residual based Engle-Granger (1987) two-step and one step procedures and 
Johansen (1988), Johansen and Juselius (1990) test for co-integration based on maximum 
likelihood method. However, there are several major disadvantages associated with these 
methods. For instance, Enders (2004) proved that variables must be integrated in the same 
order by definition for co-integration in Engle-Granger procedure. These two methods for 
finding the co-integration are not that much reliable for studies with small sample size. This 
research work adopts relatively a new technique for testing the existence of a co-integration 
which developed in a series of studies by Pesaran and Shin (1995a,1995b) and Pesaran, Shin 
and Smith (1996,2001)known as Auto-Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Bounds Test 
methodology. 
 
The bounds testing approach has certain econometric advantages in comparison to other co-
integration procedures, According Pesaran(1997), the ARDL procedure yields precise 
estimates of long run parameters and valid t-statistics even in the presence of endogenous 
variables. In line with Banerjee et al. (1993), the error correction model (ECM) can be 
derived from the ARDL through a simple liner transformation. In addition, the ARDL 
approach to test for the existence of a long-run relationship among the variables is applicable 
regardless of whether the underlying regressors are purely I(0), purely I(1), or mutually 
integrated. Finally, according to Narayan (2005), the small sample properties of the bounds 
testing approach are far superior to that of multivariate co-integration14. So considering all the 
above mentioned points and based on the theory that per capita GDP in dependent on 
                                                            
14In particular, Pesaran and Shin (1999) show that the ARDL approach has better properties in sample sizes up to 
150 observations 
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investment, government expenditure and educational expenditure the unconditional ARDL–
ECM representation of the empirical equation (I) can be designed as follows: 
1 2 2 2
p
t 50 1 t-1 2 t-1 3 t-1 4 t-1 t-1 i t-i
i= 1
q q q q
ti t-i t-i t-i i t-i
i= 0 i 0 i 0 i= 0
ln Y =β +λ lnY +λ ln IN V λ lnG V X λ lnE D X λ lnZ η lnΔY
+ θ Δ ln IN V lnG V X lnE D X γ Δ lnZ + u                  (I.a)i i
 
    
     

   
 
Where β0 is the constant and tu is the white noise error term. The terms associated with 
summation signs denote the short run dynamics, whereas λis are the long run multipliers. In 
order to maintain consistency, the bounds test must be executed on the second model (II) also. 
Because of adding corruption as an independent variable in the model, co-integration may not 
be found or vice-verse. The equations for the model with corruption are given in Appendix-3.
 The first step in the ARDL bounds test approach is to estimate equation (I.a) by ordinary least 
square (OLS) method. The regression results of the full model are of no interest. An F-test is 
performed to test the presence of long run relationship among the variables. The null 
hypothesis of non-existence of long run relationship in equation (I.a) o 1 2 3 4 5H :λ =λ =λ =λ =λ =0 is 
tested against the alternative hypothesis of co-integration o 1 2 3 4 5H : λ 0,λ 0,λ 0,λ 0,λ 0, 0      . 
However, the asymptotic distribution of this F-statistic is nonstandard, depending on the 
regressors whether they are I (0) or I (1). It rests on the number of regressors and whether the 
ARDL model comprises an intercept and/or trend. If the computed F-statistic is greater than 
the upper critical value, the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship (No Co-integration) 
can be rejected irrespective of the orders of integration for the time series. On the contrary, if 
the test statistic is less than the lower critical value the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
However, if the test statistics lies between the lower and upper critical values, no conclusion 
regarding co-integration can be made. Two sets of critical values are provided in Pesaran and 
Pesaran (1997) and in Pesaran et al. (2001).These critical values are generated on sample 
sizes of 500 and 1000 observations and 20,000 and 40,000 replications, respectively. 
However, Narayan (2005) argue that such critical values cannot be used for small sample 
sizes like the one in this study.15 Given the relatively small sample size in the present study 
                                                            
15 For instance, he makes a comparison of the critical values generated with 31 observations and the critical 
values in Pesaran et al. (2001) and finds that the upper bound CV at the 5% significance level for 31 
observations with 4 regressors is 18.3% lower than the CV for 31 observations 
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(25 observations); I extract the appropriate critical values from Narayan (2005) which were 
generated for small sample sizes of between 30 and 80 observations. The appropriate lag 
length for the model can be selected on the basis Schawrtz-Bayesian Criteria (SBC) and 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) or any other information criterion. After finding a long run 
relationship (co-integration) among the variables, the following the conditional ARDL (p, q1, 
q2, q3, q4) long run model for Yt is estimated in the second step: 
31 2 4qq q qp
t t0 21i t-i i t-i 3i t-i 4i t-i 5i t-i
i=1 i=0 i=0 i 0 i=0
lnY =β λ lnY + λ lnINV λ lnGVX λ lnEDX λ lnZ +u                               (I.b)

       
 
Following the same procedure, the long run model adding corruption as an independent 
variable can be estimated. In the third and final step, we obtain the short-run dynamic 
parameters by estimating an error correction model (ECM) associated with the long-run 
estimates. This is specified as below: 
31 2 4qq q qp
t 0 i t-i i t-i t-i t-i i t-i t-1 t
i=1 i=0 i 0 i 0 i=0
lnY =β + η lnY + θ ΔlnINV lnGVX lnEDX γ ΔlnZ υECM +u        (I.c)i i
 
              
Here, the most important point should be kept in mind that the sign of the error correction 
term must be negative. All coefficients of the short run equation (I.c) are coefficients relating 
to the short run dynamics of the models convergence to equilibrium and υ represents the 
speed of adjustment for short run divergence to the long run equilibrium. It shows how 
disequilibrium of the previous year’s shock adjusts back to the long run equilibrium in the 
current year.  
Last of all, in order to ascertain that the estimated models do not suffer from serial correlation, 
non-normality and heteroscidasticity, I have performed Ljung-Box test, Jarque–Bera test and 
Shapiro–Wilk test and ARCH test respectively in each model. Moreover, even in the presence 
of co-integration, the results will be erratic, if the parameters are not constant. In order to test 
for long-run parameter stability, Pesaran and Pesaran (1997) suggest applying the cumulative 
sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) test proposed by Brown et al (1975) to the residuals of 
the estimated ARDL-ECMs to test for parameter constancy.  
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Chapter-5: Contemporaneous correlation and graphical analyses 
Before moving to formal empirical analysis, it is a good idea to show the relationship among 
the variables using contemporaneous correlation and graphical analysis. Although correlation 
matrix cannot give us the exact relationship among the variables of this study, 
contemporaneous correlation among all the variables has been calculated in the following 
table-2 in order to understand how the variables are moving and how these are correlated.  
 
It is evident that the contemporaneous correlation between Y and the level of INV, GVX and 
EDX is positive and very high. It is also noticeable total factor productivity growth rate and 
real per capita GDP is positively correlated though the magnitude is low. We can see that 
correlation between GDP per capita and corruption is negative which is -0.58.There also exist 
negative correlation between the level of corruption and the determinants of economic 
growth. For example, investment and corruption has a negative correlation by the magnitude 
of 0.63. The relationship among other variables is not that much important here. Graphical 
presentation is another to describe data systematically. The plot of underlying variables in 
natural logarithmic form is depicted in figure-1 on the next page. Guided by the theoretical 
explanation I have constructed a new variable denoted by Z by adding up total factor 
productivity, population growth and depreciation rates. There is clearly an increasing trend in 
real GDP per capita which indicates Bangladesh has maintained a good growth rate during the 
last two decades. Investment and public education expenditure is also increasing with very 
little fluctuations. As illustrated in the figure-3, government final consumption series has also 
 
 
 Table-2: Correlation Matrix among the variables in levels  
 
Variables  Y N TFP INV GVX EDX COR 
Y  1.00       
 
N  -0.95 1.00      
 
TFP  0.45 -0.49 1.00     
 
INV  0.94 -0.95 0.45 1.00    
 
GVX  0.87 -0.85 0.43 0.82 1.00   
 
EDX  0.85 -0.94 0.49 0.95 0.71 1.00  
 
COR  -0.58 0.73 -0.71 -0.63 -0.46 -0.77 1.00 
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Chapter-6: Presentation of the empirical results 
6. 1: Unit Root Tests 
Although it is not necessary that all the variables must be integrated in same order in ARDL 
Bounds testing procedure for co-integration, unit root must be conducted in order to ascertain 
that no variable is integrated in order of beyond I (2).Because the critical values for F-
statistics for bounds tests are not valid in the presence of any I(2) variable 
(Ouattara,2004).The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)and Phillips-Perron tests are conducted 
for this purpose proposed by Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips and Perron (1988).The 
result of the unit root tests are provided in table-4.  
Notes:   1) (***), (**) and (*) represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
2) Lag lengths are in parenthesis.              
              3) The critical values are based on the finite sample values computed by McKinnon (1991).  
 
 
Table -3: Unit Root Tests 
 
 
Test 
 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) 
Null Hypothesis: Unit Root 
 
 
Phillip-Perron (P-P ) 
Null Hypothesis: Unit Root 
  Decision 
Variable Trend  and Constant 
 
Constant 
 
No Trend 
and 
Constant 
Trend and 
Constant Constant 
lnY -0.399(0) -- -- -0.489 8.1308 
I(1) 
ΔlnY -5.717*** -- -- -5.866*** -- 
lnINV -1.601(1) -0.678(1) 1.862(1) -1.295 -0.663  
I(1) 
 ΔlnINV -3.097(0) -3.167
**(0) -- -3.100 -3.172** 
lnGVX -3.247
*(1) -1.643(1) 0.656(1) -2.451 -1.178 
I(1) 
ΔlnGVX -3.401*(0) -3.525**(0) -- -3.378* -3.502** 
lnEDX -2.032(4) -1.341(4) 0.4522(4) -1.210 -2.515 
I(1) 
ΔlnEDX -5.133***(1) -- -- -5.934*** -- 
lnCOR -2.634(2) -1.6718(2) -1.024(2) -1.596 -1.111 
I(1) 
ΔlnCOR -2.972(0) -3.062**(0) -- -3.040 -3.123** 
lnZ -3.863
**(0) 
 
-3.399**(0) -- -3.921** -3.470** 
I(0) ΔlnZ -- -- -- - 8.459*** -- 
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The last column of the table reports the order of integration. The null hypothesis of existence 
of unit root in both tests is tested against alternative hypothesis of no unit root.I draw 
conclusion about the order of integration whether the series has both trend and constant and 
only constant or no constant and trend. I have chosen 5% significant level to test the null 
hypotheses in each case. The result indicates that all variables expect lnZ are non-stationary at 
their levels but stationary when 1st difference is taken in each test. The series lnY is non-
stationary with trend and constant but it becomes stationary at 1 % level after taking the 1st 
difference. lnEDX is also stationary at 1% level at it is 1st difference. According to ADF test 
lnZ is I (0) but I (1) in PP test. As none of the selected series is beyond (1) according to two 
unit root tests results, I can confidently apply Bounds test to examine co-integration among 
variables. 
 
6. 2: Results of Bounds Test for Co-integration 
 
In the first stage of Bounds test, I conduct OLS regression for the base model as well as the 
model with corruption. To obtain parsimonious specification I have adopted “General-to-
Specific Modeling” approach guided by short data span .In this case, I have chosen 2(two) as 
maximum order of legs as the observations are annual suggested by Pesaran and Shin (1999) 
and Narayan (2004).Here, it must be noted that visual inspection of all the series indicates that 
there may be one structural break in the series of government final consumption expenditure 
in 1993. In order to be certain, I have applied Quandt likelihood ratio16 (QLR) test for 
detecting the structural break in the models. The result of this test identifies that there is in 
fact a structural break in 1993.Therefore, I put a dummy variable “D1” for this period in each 
model when the OLS regression is performed. To work with general-to-specific modeling 
procedure, I have eliminated the insignificant lags except for the level variables and intercept. 
The benefit of this approach is that it ensures the assumption of no serial correlation as 
emphasized by Pesaran et.al (2001) and normality is not violated. I have used Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) to determine the optimal number of lags to be included in the 
unconditional ARDL-ECMs. Thus the order of selected ARDL models are of (1, 1, 1, 0, 1) 
and (1, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0) for the base model and model with corruption respectively.  
 
                                                            
16Detail is available in the article  “Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change With Unknown Change 
Point” by Donald W. K. Andrews(1993) 
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The computed F-statistics with the appropriate critical values17 for testing long run relation or 
co-integration are reported in Table-4A and Table-4B for the base model (eqn. I.a. ) and 
model with corruption (eqn. II.a). 
 
The calculated F-Statistics in both cases (13.830and 22.05) are higher than the upper bound 
critical value even at 1% significant levels which clearly implies that we can confidently 
reject the null hypothesis of no integration. Put differently, there exists a strong evidence of 
long run relationship among the variables in both models. Thus, we can proceed to next step 
to estimate the long run models as there is co-integration. The diagnostic tests on selected 
ARDL models are presented in table–A4 of appendix-4.There is evidence of auto correlation 
at lag-2 model with corruption .That is why I have used Newey-West HAC-standard errors to 
generate precise standard errors is this case to tackle for presence of autocorrelation. Again, 
the plots of Rec-CUSUM and OLS-based CUSUM tests to check for long-run parameter 
stability are also enclosed in Appendix-5. It is clear from figure-A2 and figure-A3 that Rec-
CUSUM and OLS-CUSUM plots stay inside the 5% critical bound thus providing 
confirmation that the parameters of both models do not suffer from any structural instability 
over the entire period of under this study. 
 
 
                                                            
17 The critical values taken here are for 30 observations .It is found as the number of observations and regresorss 
increase, critical value decreases. 
 
Table-4A:Bounds Tests for   Co-integration (Base model-I) 
      Calculated 
F-statistics 
1% Critical Bound* 5% Critical Bound* 10% Critical Bound* 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
       
13.83 4.280 5.840 3.058 4.223 2.525 3.560 
Table-4B: Bounds Tests for   Co-integration (Model with corruption-II) 
Calculated 
F-statistics 
1% Critical Bound* 5% Critical Bound* 10% Critical Bound* 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
       
22.05 4.134 5.761 2.910 4.193 2.407 3.517 
Note:* Extracted from Narayan(2004) with 5 regressors and with restricted  intercept and no trend 
Note:* Extracted from Narayan(2004) with 4 regressors and with restricted  intercept and no trend 
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6. 3: Estimated long run results  
 
As I have found long run relationships among the variables in both models, I can proceed to 
estimate two different long run models to find the long run impact of corruption on the 
economy of Bangladesh. The estimates of the long run coefficients for both models results are 
presented together the in table-5 for the sake of comparison. The sign of all coefficients are 
positive in the base model as expected on the basis theoretical framework developed in 
chapter-3.It is clear from the table that GDP per capita of the present period is highly 
dependent on last year’ one and is statistically significant at 1 % level. From the base model, 
results show that investment is one of the significant determinants of GDP for Bangladesh. 
Other things being held, a 1% increase in physical capital investment causes around 0.12% 
Table -5: Estimated Long Run Coefficients using the ARDL Technique 
 
Dependent 
Variable: lnYt 
        Base Model           Model with Corruption 
Regressors 
 
Coefficients 
 
T-Ratios Coefficients T- Ratios 
Constant -0.371 
*** -5.962(0.000)     -0.046 -0.242(0.812) 
lnYt-1 1.053*** 67.547(0.000) - - 
lnYt-2 - - 0.895*** 16.576(0.000) 
lnINVt    0.124*** 5.701(0.000)      0.068 0.666(0.517) 
lnINVt-1  0.139** 2.608(0.021) 0.319*** 3.218(0.006) 
lnINVt-2  -0.258*** -3.073(0.008) - - 
lnGVXt  0.033*  1.960(0.071) 0.057 1.301(0.215) 
lnEDXt      0.004  0.395(0.699) -0.088** -2.772(0.015) 
lnEDXt-1      0.016  0.638(0.534) -0.057* -1.836(0.089) 
lnZt   0.012***  5.635(0.000) 0.007 1.476(0.163) 
lnCORt - -    -0.102*** -4.268(0.000) 
D1   -0.021***  -4.067(0.001) -0.022* -1.866(0.084) 
 Adj. R
2=0.999 
F(9,13)=   5247( 0.000) 
Adj. R2=0.9995 
F(9,13)=    2424( 0.000) 
Note: (***), (**) and (*) represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
p-values are in parenthesis. 
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increment in per capita real GDP. lnGVX is significant at 10% level and a 1% rise in GVX 
leads to around 0.3% increase in per  capita GDP. It reveals that government expenditure in 
other words public sector is not contributing to economic growth in Bangladesh as much as 
expected in a developing county. Public expenditure on education (lnEDX) does not have a 
significant impact on GDP in statistical terms and its magnitude is also small (0.004). The 
estimate of the accumulated term lnZ is significant at 1% level but effect on the economy is 
very low (0.012). Now I am going to analyze the results of the extended model with 
corruption. After adding corruption as an independent variable in the regression analysis, 
corruption (lnCOR) is found to be highly significant (at 1% level) and its effect on real GDP 
per capita of  Bangladesh during 1984-2008 in negative. It shows the direct impact of 
corruption in the economy in the long run. According to our results, real per capita GDP in 
Bangladesh reduces by 0.10%in the long run if there is a1% increase in the level of corruption 
other thing being held constant. This result is similar to the findings of cross sectional study of 
Mauro (1995), Rahman et.al (2000) and Dreher and Herzfel (2005). Based on the above 
results, we can say that real GDP per capita in Bangladesh would be 508.20 US$ instead of 
462.12 US$ in 2008 if it could reduce its level of corruption by 1%. 
 
Now let us move to the discussion on how corruption is affecting the economy through 
different mechanisms i.e. indirect affect described in the theoretical chapter. Table-5 reports 
that coefficient of physical capital investment (lnINV) has become insignificant at the 
presence of corruption and its magnitude is also reduced to 0.068. It implies that corruption 
has substantial negative consequence on investment of Bangladesh. Previous cross sectional 
empirical studies have also found similar result. On the other hand, the size of the coefficient 
for government final consumption expenditure (lnGVX) or public sector investment has 
increased but it insignificant now. In this regard, we can say that public sector investment has 
increased but it does have not significant contribution to the economic growth of Bangladesh. 
Earlier studies such as Gupta, Mello and Sharan(2001), Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) Mauro 
(1998) have got this kind of result in cross country analysis. In developing countries, there are 
many opportunities of corruption in public sector. For example, government official and 
politicians can take bribe by importing unnecessary modern technological equipments, which 
are not appropriate in the current stage of development. My findings also indicate that 
corruption has negative impact on human capital investment. The result shows that public 
sector education expenditure has negative influence on per capita GDP at presence of 
corruption in Bangladesh. 
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So based on the long run results and above discussion, we can conclude that corruption has 
negative consequences in economic growth of Bangladesh. It has direct negative impact on 
per capita GDP as well as through different transmission mechanisms of economic growth. 
The estimates of the short-run dynamic coefficients associated with the long-run relationships 
obtained from the ECM equations are presented in table-6. The equilibrium error correction 
term ECMt-1 is significant in both models with negative sign which reinforces the existence of 
long run relationship among the variables. The estimated ECMt-1 term is the indicator of how 
disequilibrium of the previous year’s shock adjusts back to the long run equilibrium in the 
current year. So it specifies that the speed of adjustment from short run deviation to long run 
equilibrium is which is fairly high (62%) in the model with corruption. We can say that about 
Table-6:  Estimated Short Run Dynamics of the Selected ARDL Models  
 
Dependent  
Variable : ΔlnYt Base Model                                   Model with Corruption 
Regressor 
 
Coefficients 
 
T-Ratios Coefficients T Ratios 
Constant 0.0009 0.205(0.841) 0.009**** 6.329(0.000) 
ΔlnYt-1      0.9130*** 3.764(0.002)  1.0797 *** 4.654(0.000) 
ΔlnYt-2 - -    0.338** 2.549(0.024) 
ΔlnINVt 0.1405 0.638(0.280)   -0.0563 -1.509(0.155) 
ΔlnINVt-1 0.0588 0.638(0.535) - - 
ΔlnGVXt 0.0037 0.104(0.918)    -0.022 -0.894(0.387) 
ΔlnEDXt -0.0258 -1.046(0.316)    -0.033* -1.988(0.068) 
ΔlnEDXt-1 -0.0059 -0.239(0.815) - - 
ΔlnZt       0.0141*** 4.474(0.000) 0.010 *** 13.66(0.000) 
ΔlnCORt - -   -0.053*** -3.043(0.009) 
ECMt-1    -1.3478** -2.727(0.018) -0.620 *** -3.183(0.007) 
D1 -0.0004 -0.060(0.953)  0.016 *** 3.455(0.004) 
 Adj. R
2 = 0.7374 
F(9,12)=  7.552(  0.000) 
Adj. R2 = 0.5681 
F(8,13)=   4.453 (   0.008) 
Note: (***), (**) and (*) represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
p-values are in parenthesis. 
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62% of imbalance from the preceding year’s shock converges back to the long-run 
equilibrium in the current year. The results of the diagnostic tests for long run models as well 
as error correction models are reported in table-A5 and table-A6 respectively in appendix-4.  
 
 
 
Chapter-7: Concluding Remarks  
Corruption has become rampant almost in every sphere of life in Bangladesh. The country is 
listed as one of the most corrupt counties in the world in various rankings of corruption. It is 
widely discussed that corruption is hurting economic progress of the country to a large extent. 
News Scan Analysis of Transparency International Bangladesh (2002) reports that about 
1.85% of the GDP had been lost because of corruption in the fiscal year of 1999-2000. 
 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to empirically investigate the impact of corruption on the 
economic development of Bangladesh using annual time series data for the period of 1984-
2008. According to my knowledge, this is the first attempt to apply a multivariate approach to 
examine the relationship between GDP per capita and corruption for Bangladesh using time 
series data. 
 
With a view to achieving the aim of the thesis, I have extended the Solow model of economic 
growth to include public sector and human capital and then reformulated this augmented 
model incorporating corruption in a specific functional form to decompose the direct and 
indirect consequences of corruption on income per capita. Based on the priori assumption of 
negative consequences of corruption, this model entails how corruption directly affects per 
capita income through total factor productivity channel as well as indirectly via physical 
capital, public sector and human capital channel. Then I have tested the long run relationship 
between corruption and real GDP per capita for that time span using ARDL Bounds method 
for co-integration using International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index as a proxy 
to measure the level corruption in Bangladesh. The results of co-integration test confirms that 
there is a long run relation among corruption, GDP per capita and other determinants of GDP 
over this period. The long run estimates indicate that corruption has direct negative impact on 
per capita GDP i.e. economic development of Bangladesh. It shows that a 1% increase in the 
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level of corruption during this period has resulted in about 10% reduction in per capita GDP 
of Bangladesh. It means that corruption is affecting the economic growth of Bangladesh 
adversely. In other words that Bangladesh could achieve faster economic development if it 
could curb widespread corruption. This finding is similar to the results of Mauro (1995), 
Rahman, Kisunko and Kapoor (2000) and Dreher and Herzfel (2005) but differs in magnitude 
as these studies are based on average of cross sectional data for different time period. Results 
from my study also suggest that corruption has strong negative impact on physical capital 
investment and human development in Bangladesh. The findings imply that corruption has 
increased public sector investment but it does not have significant contribution to economic 
growth of Bangladesh in the presence of high level of corruption. 
 
The main limitation of my study is the short time span that the study considers and annual 
data. The reason behind that is the unavailability of the data on measurement of corruption for 
longer time period. Besides trade and remittances from abroad have significant contributions 
in economic growth of Bangladesh in recent years, a fact that has not been considered in this 
study. Future researches may get results that are more robust after the inclusion of these 
determinants of GDP using data for longer periods. However, it will not probably alter the 
conclusion drawn from my time series analysis that corruption has strong and significant 
retarding consequences on economic development of Bangladesh.  
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Appendix -2: 
Table-A1: List of Variables 
Notes: 1) Natural logs of all variables are taken after extracting from the original source. 
           2) http://www.conference-board.org/data/economydatabase/" 
3) Rescaled to an index ranging from “1 to 0” 
 
Table –A2: Correlation matrix of Different Corruption Indices 
 
 
 
 
Source:Dahlstrom,T.(2009):“Causes of Corruption” JIBS Dissertation Series No.05 
 
Variables1 Involved Original Source 
 Real GDP Per Capita(Constant 2000 US$)  World Bank(WDI online data base) 
 Total Factor Productivity Growth rate (%) The Conference Board Total Economy 
Database2, January2010 
 Population growth rate (%) 
  
World Bank(WDI online data base) 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation or 
Investment(% of GDP) 
World Bank(WDI online data base) 
Government Final Consumption Expenditure 
(% of GDP)  
World bank(WDI online data base) and 
Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh 
Public Expenditure on Education(%of GDP) World bank(WDI online data base) ,  
Ministry of Finance and Ministry of 
Education, Bangladesh, Bangladesh 
Corruption Index3 (Ranging from “0” to “6”) 
The Higher value the lower the level of 
corruption on a country. 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) -
prepared by The Political Risk 
Services(PRS) Inc. 
Index KK TI ICRG 
KK 1.00 0.96** 0.88** 
TI 0.96** 1.00 0.87** 
ICRG 0.88** 0.87** 1.00 
      ** Correlation is significant at 0.01 level(2-tailed) 
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Appendix-2
 
 
1) The  unconditional ARDL –VECM representation of the empirical equation (II)  
p
t 0 1 t-1 2 t-1 3 t-1 4 t-1 5 t-1 6 t-1 i t-i
i=1
q q q q q
i t-i t-i t-i i t-i i t-i t
i=0 i 0 i 0 i=0 i=0
ln Y =β +λ lnY +λ lnINV λ lnGVX λ lnEDX λ lnZ λ lnCOR η ΔlnY
+ θ ΔlnINV lnGVX lnEDX γ ΔlnZ + ψ ΔlnCOR +u                 (II.a)i i
 
     
     

    
 
2) The conditional ARDL (p, q1, q2, q3, q4,q5) long run model for Yt 
 
3 51 2 4q qq q qp
t 0 1i t-i 2i t-i 3i t-i 4i t-i 5i t-i 6i t-i t
i=1 i=0 i=0 i 0 i=0 i=0
lnY =β λ lnY + λ lnINV λ lnGVX λ lnEDX λ lnZ + λ lnCOR +u                  (II.b)

        
 
     3)  The Error Correction Model (ECM): 
 
3 51 2 4q qq q qp
t 0 i t-i i t-i t-i t-i i t-i i t-i t-1 t
i=1 i=0 i 0 i 0 i=0 i=0
lnY =β + η lnY + θΔlnINV lnGVX lnEDX γΔlnZ ψΔlnCOR υECM +u       (II.c)i i
 
              
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Table-A3: Summary Statistics of all the variables in levels 
Variables  No. of  Obs. Minimum Maximum Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Y  25 236.71 462.12 
 
312.32 68.46 
N  25 1.41 2.57 
 
1.96 0.33 
TFP  25 -3.81 1.29 
 
-0.52 1.55 
INV  25 15.92 24.65 20.15 3.29 
GVX  25 4.14 5.54 
 
4.71 0.49 
EDX  25 1.29 2.56 
 
2.07 0.41 
COR  25 0.58 1.00 
 
0.79 0.15 
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   Table-A4: Diagnostic Tests for  Selected ARDL Models 
 
      Base Model Model with Corruption 
Adj. R2  
F-Statistics 
 
F F
Liung Box lag-1  
Liung Box lag-2  
F-ARCH (4) F F
Jarque-Bera  
Shapiro-Wilk W W
Table-A5: Diagnostic Tests for  Long Run Models 
 
                                   Base model                           Model with Corruption 
Liung Box lag-1 
 
2(1)=2.433(0.118) 2(1)=1.456(0.227) 
 
Liung Box lag-2 
 
2 (2)=2.4511(0.293)
 
2 (2)=1.790(0.408) 
 
F-ARCH (4) F(4,14)=0.0491(0.996) F(4,14)=0.325(0.856) 
Jarque-Bera 2 (2)=1.596(0.450) 2 (2)=1.296(0.522) 
 
Shapiro-Wilk W=0.942(0.200) W= 0.946(0.248) 
     Table-A6: Diagnostic Tests for  Error Corrections Models 
 
Base model                                  Model with Corruption 
Liung Box lag-1
 
2(1)= 0.074(0.784) 2(1)=1.679(0.195) 
 
Liung Box lag-2
 
2 (2)=0.810(0.666)
 
2 (2)=3.905(0.141) 
 
F-ARCH (4) F(4,13)= 0.218( 0.923) F(4,13)= 0.611( 0.661) 
Jarque-Bera 2 (2)=1.294( 0.523) 2 (2)=3.717(0.155) 
 
Shapiro-Wilk W =  0.963(0.558) W = 0.942(0.227) 
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Appendix -5 
 
 
Figure-A2: CUSUM Test for Coefficients Stability for ARDL Model-(I .a) 
 
 
 
Figure-A3: CUSUM Test for Coefficients Stability for ARDL Model-(II.a) 
 
 
 
(a) Plot of Rec-CUSUM Test
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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(b) Plot of OLS-based CUSUM Test
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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(a) Plot of Rec-CUSUM Test
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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(b) Plot of OLS-based CUSUM Test
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
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